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INTRODUCTION 
In its most general form, evolutionary psychology is simply psychology that 
is properly grounded in evolutionary biology. But most research that falls 
under the banner of evolutionary psychology might be given a more specific 
gloss, as the Darwinian adaptationist programme applied to the mind/brain. 
How does this idea work?1  
Viewed through the lens of Darwinian theory, organisms are (for the 
most part) integrated collections of adaptations, where adaptations are 
phenotypic traits that are evolved responses to adaptive problems, and 
where adaptive problems are selection pressures — recurring environmental 
conditions that influence reproductive success, or fitness, of individual 
organisms. Adaptations, then, contribute (or once contributed) to the 
reproductive success of the organisms that have them. Fitness maximisation 
per se is not a goal of individual organisms, however. Organisms cannot 
seek directly to maximise their fitness, since what counts as fitness-
promoting behaviour in one situation or for one individual is not likely to be 
so in another situation or for another individual (Cosmides & Tooby, 1987; 
Symons, 1992). Rather, thanks to their specific adaptations, individual 
organisms have correspondingly specific goals that are tied to particular 
aspects of their physical and social environments, and to the lives they lead 
in those environments, and which affect, directly or indirectly, their 
reproductive success. In other words, organisms maximise their fitness by 
solving many specific adaptive problems. Evolutionary psychology 'simply' 
applies this well-established Darwinian reasoning to the human brain. Thus 
conceived, the brain is an integrated collection of psychological 
åmechanisms that evolved because their behavioural effects tended to help 
maintain or increase the fitness of organisms whose brains contained those 
mechanisms. The human brain is thus viewed as a system of psychological 
adaptations, a system shaped by natural selection to solve many specific 
adaptive problems.   
Of course, adaptive problems (psychological or otherwise) are not set 
in stone: the goal posts often move, because while certain environmental 
conditions, such as sunlight coming from above (Ramachandran, 1988), will 
remain constant for aeons, other such conditions will change across 
evolutionary time. Against this background, a key claim often made by 
evolutionary psychologists is that the adaptive problem to which some 
psychological mechanism is an evolved response must be specified by 
reference to a certain ancestral environment, what is often called the 
organism's environment of evolutionary adaptedness, or EEA. For humans, 
this claim is typically unpacked via the following argument: Given the slow 
pace of evolutionary change, the last time any significant modifications 
could have been made, by selection, to the functional architecture of the 
human brain, was during the Pleistocene era. The Pleistocene is thus the 
                                                
1 It is not our intention here to engage directly with the basic line of reasoning and 
argument that grounds evolutionary psychology, but what we do wish to do 
requires that we first briefly summarise its main features (see Atkinson & Wheeler, 
under review; Bloom, 1999; Cummins & Cummins, 1999; Samuels, 1998, 2000; 
Wheeler & Atkinson, 2001, for reviews and critical analyses).  
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most significant part of the human EEA. Put crudely, the thought is that we 
have ancient hunter-gatherer minds inhabiting 21st century environments.  
A major task facing the evolutionary psychologist is therefore to show 
just how modern human behaviour is produced by psychological 
adaptations to ancestral environments. For present purposes, however, a 
rather different issue is to the fore. Several prominent evolutionary 
psychologists have argued that, on the basis of the kind of evolutionary 
reasoning sketched out above, we should expect the mind's information-
processing architecture to consist in myriad domain-specific devices rather 
than a relatively small number of domain-general devices (e.g., Baron-
Cohen, 1995; Buss, 1999; Cosmides & Tooby, 1987, 1994a, 1994b, 1992; 
Gigerenzer, 1997; Pinker, 1994, 1997; Sperber, 1996; Symons, 1992; Tooby 
& Cosmides, 1992, 1995, 2000). As we have explained elsewhere (Atkinson 
& Wheeler, under review; Wheeler & Atkinson, 2001), these arguments 
depend on the idea that domains are to be defined in terms of adaptive 
problems. So a feature of our cognitive architecture will be maximally 
domain-specific just when it is dedicated to solving one particular adaptive 
problem, and maximally domain-general just when it can contribute to the 
solution of any adaptive problem whatsoever. The evolutionary-
psychological claim, then, is that since the brain's functional architecture is 
a system of psychological adaptations that reflect the vast range of adaptive 
problems that our hunter-gatherer ancestors faced, it must be a multifarious 
suite of innately specified, domain-specific devices (often called modules). 
This, in short, is the 'Massive Modularity Hypothesis' (MMH) (Samuels, 
1998, 2000; Sperber, 1996). 
While the MMH is both widely endorsed within evolutionary 
psychology and championed vigorously by some leading theorists, not all 
who are broadly sympathetic to the overall evolutionary-psychological 
enterprise are ardent advocates of the idea (e.g., Cummins & Cummins, 
1999; Shapiro & Epstein, 1998). And the MMH has certainly attracted a 
good deal of critical fire from outside the discipline. That combination of 
pre-eminence and controversy has motivated several detailed critical 
examinations of the MMH’s core concepts and arguments (e.g., Atkinson & 
Wheeler, under review; Samuels, 1998, 2000; Wheeler & Atkinson, 2001), 
to which can be added the present chapter. 
 In their recent book on the philosophy of biology, Sterelny and 
Griffiths (1999) devote two chapters to evolutionary psychology. Within 
these two chapters, they devote little more than a couple of pages to the 
presentation of a problem that they see as posing a significant threat to the 
viability of an explanatory programme predicated on the MMH. 
Evolutionary psychology, Sterelny and Griffiths argue, faces a "grain 
problem". In essence, their conception of this problem is that attempts to 
identify evolved, domain-specific modules require one to fix a single level 
of description at which the selection pressures in play are specified, but that 
the process of fixing that level will often be arbitrary. In the next section, we 
elucidate Sterelny and Griffiths' view of evolutionary psychology's grain 
problem, showing that their account in fact contains two threats to 
evolutionary psychology, not just one. Having suggested that one of these 
problems is the more worrying for evolutionary psychology, we turn, in the 
third section, to our own vision of the grain problem. We reveal a second 
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dimension to the difficulty that Sterelny and Griffiths do not notice (or at 
any rate, do not make explicit), and that transforms the grain problem into a 
far more serious challenge to evolutionary psychology than is present in 
their narrower interpretation. In the subsequent five sections, we present a 
detailed examination of the interdisciplinary, multilevel approach to the 
study of cognition offered by evolutionarily inspired cognitive neuroscience, 
using research on social cognition and reasoning as a case study. In doing 
this we show that evolutionary psychologists can and do live with the two-
dimensional grain problem. 
 
THE GRAIN PROBLEM ACCORDING TO 
STERELNY AND GRIFFITHS 
Sterelny and Griffiths (1999) identify a problem for evolutionary 
psychology (in fact, it seems, for Darwinian selective reasoning in general), 
which comes into view when one combines the following two observations: 
(i) at a fairly gross level of description, a range of coarse-grained adaptive 
problems can be distinguished that might include obtaining sustenance, 
avoiding predators, selecting mates, reproducing, and caring for offspring; 
(ii) many such coarse-grained adaptive problems may also be appropriately 
described as hierarchically organised complexes of progressively finer-
grained adaptive problems. Consider, for example, a problem for animals 
that live in complex social environments, namely, that of predicting the 
behaviour of conspecifics and adjusting one’s own behaviour accordingly, a 
solution for which, in humans at least, is the ability to ‘mindread’. What 
might appear to be a unitary problem at a coarse-grained level of description 
can nevertheless be decomposed into a set of more specific problems. 
Candidate component problems include: interpreting movements in terms of 
goals and desires, attributing perceptual states to others, attributing shared 
attention and knowledge, and attributing mental states (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 
1995; Leslie, 1994). And each of these more specific problems might 
themselves be decomposed into yet finer-grained problems: attributing 
perceptual states, for example, might involve the separable abilities to detect 
eyes and to track their gaze. Or consider mate selection. Sterelny and 
Griffiths ask, rhetorically, "Is the problem of mate choice a single problem 
or a mosaic of many distinct problems?" (p. 328). Is choosing a mate a 
single adaptive problem, or is it a set of related problems, such as: choosing 
someone of the opposite sex, someone who shows good reproductive 
prospects, and someone who shows signs of being a good parent? Or at a yet 
finer-grained level of description, is the problem of choosing someone with 
good reproductive prospects a single problem or a set of related problems, 
such as choosing someone who is young, who is healthy, of high status, 
etc.? (See also Sterelny, 1995.) The implied outcome of this rhetorical 
interrogation is, of course, that there is no final answer to any of the 
questions posed, and that this indeterminacy is a feature of evolutionary 
scenarios in general (or, at least, of significantly many of them), rather than 
just a local nuisance specific to mate choice. If this is correct, then the 
dilemma facing the evolutionary theorist is not merely that adaptive 
problems are, typically, hierarchical and nested. Rather, the full dilemma is 
that, since no particular level in a selective hierarchy — or, as one might 
say, no individual descriptive grain — takes explanatory precedence over 
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any other, any decision to promote a single descriptive grain as the one at 
which the selection pressures in operation ought to be specified is simply 
arbitrary. This is the difficulty that Sterelny and Griffiths dub the grain 
problem.2 (For now we shall use the term 'grain problem' to indicate the 
grain problem as Sterelny and Griffiths see it. In the next section, however, 
we shall argue that this is in fact a limited version of the real grain problem.)   
But how, exactly, does the fact that attempts to specify adaptive 
problems are encumbered by a plurality of equally viable descriptive grains 
come to constitute a problem for evolutionary psychology? Here, with a few 
clarificatory bells and whistles, is what Sterelny and Griffiths say: 
The grain problem in evolutionary psychology 
challenges the idea that adaptations [in this context, 
cognitive devices] are explained by the [adaptive] 
problem to which the adapted trait [some single 
cognitive device] is a solution. If (but only if) there is a 
single cognitive device that guides an organism's 
behavior with respect to issues of mate choice [for 
example], then mate choice is a single domain, and 
these [more specific problems] are all different aspects 
of the same problem. It is not the existence of a single 
problem confronting the organism that explains the 
module [the single cognitive device], but the existence 
of the module that explains why we think of mate 
choice as a single problem. (Sterelny and Griffiths, 
1999, pp. 328-329). 
What are we to make of this short explication of the threat posed by the 
grain problem? As far as we can tell, the target passage is consistent with 
two different interpretations of that threat, which are not clearly 
distinguished by Sterelny and Griffiths. Moreover, these distinct 
interpretations actually constitute alternative, rather than complementary, 
arguments against evolutionary psychology. The difference between the two 
possible interpretations here turns on how we unpack the two key points 
made in the target passage, namely: 
(i) that the grain problem challenges the view that cognitive devices (as 
adapted traits) are explained by the adaptive problem to which those 
devices are a solution; and 
(ii) that evolutionary psychologists will be in a position to say with 
certainty why some, but not other, related adaptive problems can be 
grouped together as a single problem, only in those cases where it is 
possible antecede8Tm (de) Tj
50 0 0ws(i) Tj 50 60 818 0 Tm ( ) Tj 50 0
0 0 0 50 1171 0 Tm (w)
Tj  0 Tm (ngl) Tj 50 0 0 50 357 0 Tm (t) Tj 50 0 0Tj 50 0 0 5 Tj 50 0
0Tj 50 0 0 50 776 0 Tm (onl0
e) Tj 50 0 0 50 1215734 0 Tm ( )983 0 Tm
(o) Tj 50 0 0 5 259 0 Tm (r) Tj 52 0 Tm (xpl) Tj 50 0 50 747 0 Tm (G) T 
1294  4
hean e ty h(]) Tj 50 0 0 50
61 Tm ( ) Tj 50 0 0
50
0
624  Tm (oou(t) Tj 50 0 0 50 Tm ( ) Tj. j  
0 50 1362 0 Tm (e) Tj 50 0 0 50 1384 0 Tm ( ) Tj ET Q Q q 13.440001 12.300058
 68.320 1 8 7.44339.12
 06s1 cs 0 0 0 sc q
 .239999 9 0 0 0.23999999 284.88
317.34006 cm BT 50 0 0 50 0 0 Tm /F2.0 1 Tf ( ) Tj ET Q Q q 13.440001 12.300058
568.32001 817.44 re W n193s1 cs 0 0 0 sc q 0.23999999 0 0 0.23999999He) Tj 50 0 0 50 30 Tm (e) Tj 50 0 0 50 15 0 Tm (e)
Tj 50 0 0 50 1339 0 Tm (e) Tj 50 0 0 50909 0 Tm (w) Tj 50 0 0 5011 0 Tm ( ) Tj 50 0 0 50 102 0 Tm (c) Tj 50 0 0 50
10 0 Tm (t) TTj 50 0 0 50 1161 0 Tm (r)
Tj 50 0 0 50 970 Tm (ngui) Tj 50
0 0 50 12 0 Tm (e) Tj 50 0 0 50 1 200 0 Tm i
h
 cnda i tsi
 Evolutionary psychology's grain problem 6 
© Anthony P. Atkinson & Michael Wheeler, 2002 
solution. This principle must surely be an essential plank of any genuinely 
Darwinian enterprise, and so must be a non-negotiable feature of the 
evolutionary-psychological treatment of cognitive devices. But how, 
exactly, is it threatened by the grain problem? Sterelny and Griffiths are 
disappointingly quiet on this point, but the answer may depend on what 
commitments we inherit when we endorse the claim that adapted traits are 
explained by their associated adaptive problems. On one understanding of 
those commitments, the evolutionary psychologist not only requires there to 
be some robust and principled method for identifying the unique adaptive 
problem to which some adapted trait constitutes an evolutionary solution, 
she also needs that method to be, in a certain sense, independent of our 
identification of the phenotypic feature that constitutes the trait to be 
explained. What is meant by 'independent' here is captured by the following 
thought: the way in which we specify an adaptive problem must not appeal 
essentially to the particular phenotypic trait that, ultimately, we intend to 
explain as the evolved solution to that problem, because if we have no 
option but to appeal to the evolutionary solution in the specification of the 
adaptive problem, then (so the argument goes) we are building into our 
explanation the very thing that we are trying to explain, and that is no 
explanation at all.  
What we have identified as point (ii) in Sterelny and Griffiths' 
exposition of the grain problem states that there is only one principled 
strategy by which the evolutionary psychologist might pin down the grain at 
which to specify an adaptive problem. That strategy is first to identify a 
distinct cognitive device (the adapted trait) subserving a distinct type of 
behaviour, and then to use that knowledge to constrain the choice of grain. 
Given the independence criterion, however, point (ii) emerges as nothing 
more than a powerful illustration of the disastrous failure of evolutionary 
psychology to solve the grain problem. Why? Because the proposed strategy 
contravenes the independence criterion, and so (under this interpretation) 
marks the failure of the evolutionary psychologist to respect the 
adaptationist principle that evolved traits are explained by the adaptive 
problems to which they are solutions. Thus if the independence criterion (or 
something like it) does figure in the correct unpacking of point (i) in 
Sterelny and Griffiths' exposition, then that fact demands a pessimistic 
reading of point (ii). (On the plus side, it also provides a much-needed 
explanation for why the second point comes hard on the heels of the first.) 
In effect, then, on this first interpretation of Sterelny and Griffiths' analysis, 
the evolutionary psychologist faces a dilemma: If she relinquishes her 
commitment to the independence criterion, then she can no longer hold 
claim to a non-negotiable principle of Darwinian explanation. But if, on the 
other hand, she holds fast to that prior explanatory principle, then she has to 
accept that in many cases there may be no non-arbitrary way of pinning 
down the choice of grain at which to specify adaptive problems, and thus no 
non-arbitrary way of explaining evolved traits in terms of the adaptive 
problems for which they are solutions.  
A second interpretation of the passage in question comes into view if, 
in fact, Sterelny and Griffiths do not intend the independence criterion to be 
required by the view that adapted traits must be explained by their 
associated adaptive problems. If an adaptive problem can rightly be said to 
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explain an adapted trait, even though that problem can be singled out only 
by specifying that trait, then, at first sight anyway, point (ii) becomes not an 
observation that simply illustrates the rout of evolutionary psychology by 
the grain problem, but rather an initially plausible response to the grain 
problem, and more specifically to the threat identified in point (i). In other 
words, on this interpretation, the grain problem is taken to threaten the 
principle that an adapted trait is explained by its associated adaptive 
problem simply because it suggests that the choice of grain at which the 
adaptive problem might be specified is often arbitrary. But without the 
background presence of the independence criterion, the antecedent 
identification of a distinct cognitive device subserving a distinct type of 
behaviour might legitimately be thought to meet this challenge by non-
arbitrarily constraining the choice of grain.   
This way of understanding Sterelny and Griffiths' argument is wholly 
in tune with the fact that they follow up the target passage reproduced above 
by immediately giving several weighty arguments for why (they think) 
evolutionary psychology has wedded itself prematurely to the idea of a 
massively modular theory of higher-level cognition, and thus for why (they 
think) the search for distinct cognitive devices subserving distinct types of 
behaviour is doomed to fail (see pp. 329-332). In other words, having 
proposed a possible response to the grain problem, Sterelny and Griffiths 
immediately mount a secondary offensive to tell us why that response won't 
work.  
We shall summarise one of Sterelny and Griffiths' second-wave 
arguments against evolved modularity — partly to illustrate their position, 
but also because, as we shall see in a moment, the conclusion of that 
argument is telling. It is an undeniable fact that our psychological 
architecture has evolved in a social environment. Such socially-embedded 
evolution is inherently interactive, in that one individual's adaptive solution 
is another's adaptive problem. This leads to a co-evolutionary arms race, in 
which each of the competing strategies in the population (say, cheating and 
cheater-detection), always in pursuit of the evolutionary advantage, 
periodically transforms itself and hence the selective environment of the 
other, in a series of adaptations and counter-adaptations. But this means, 
Sterelny and Griffiths claim, that our evolved psychological mechanisms 
cannot be modules — that is, innate domain-specific mechanisms that are 
hard-wired to solve long-enduring adaptive problems — simply because, in 
the co-evolutionary arms races that characterise social environments, there 
are "no stable problems … to which natural selection can grind out a 
solution. The 'adaptive problem' is always being transformed in an arms 
race" (p. 331).  
So, on the first interpretation of Sterelny and Griffiths' position, the 
grain problem is decisive, since even if distinct cognitive devices subserving 
distinct types of behaviour were there to be found (something which the 
secondary offensive calls into doubt), the appeal to the antecedent 
identification of such devices would fall foul of the independence criterion. 
On the second interpretation, the antecedent identification of distinct 
cognitive devices would, in principle, enable us to solve the grain problem. 
In this instance, the case against evolutionary psychology is completed by 
the secondary offensive, which aims to provide good reasons to think that 
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such devices are simply not there to be found. But which of these options is 
the correct interpretation?  
In our view, the exegetical waters here are far from clear. However, 
one way to approach the matter is to take a step back, and to ask whether or 
not adaptationist explanation, in any form, really is committed to the 
independence criterion. This move highlights a further tension in Sterelny 
and Griffiths' argument. In constructing the interactive-social-evolution 
argument against evolved modularity (described just above), Sterelny and 
Griffiths depend on the claim that evolutionary psychologists adopt a view 
of adaptation as being essentially a process of accommodation to a pre-
existing environment or set of adaptive problems. Such a view of adaptation 
is at least strongly suggestive of the independence criterion. In contrast, and 
on the basis of their account of social evolution, Sterelny and Griffiths 
promote a notion of adaptation as transformation, concluding that "cognitive 
adaptation often transforms the environment rather than being an 
accommodation to it. So there will be real troubles in store for a 
methodology of discovering the mechanisms of the mind that proceeds by 
first trying to discover the problems that it must solve, and then testing for 
the presence of the solutions" (pp. 331-332). But is evolutionary psychology 
inextricably bound to the allegedly problematic view of adaptation as 
accommodation? The crucial point here is that while there seems to be no 
room for the independence criterion in the view of adaptation that Sterelny 
and Griffiths promote, still they do not suggest that explanations in terms of 
adaptation as transformation are anything other than solidly Darwinian-
adaptationist in character. But this means that even if, in practice, 
evolutionary psychologists do tend to adopt an independence-criterion-
friendly view of adaptation as accommodation,  they nevertheless could, in 
principle, avail themselves of the adaptation-as-transformation view, 
without being duty bound to give back their copy of the Descent of Man. So 
even if it is true that adaptation must often be conceived as transformation 
rather than accommodation, evolutionary psychology, as a Darwinian 
theoretical endeavour, can continue intact. Our conclusion, then, is that it is 
the second interpretation of Sterelny and Griffiths' argument that has the 
intellectual legs here, precisely because it does not make the apparently 
unreasonable assumption that evolutionary psychology is, in principle, 
wedded to the independence criterion. 
 
THE TWO-DIMENSIONAL GRAIN PROBLEM 
Notwithstanding the fact that Sterelny and Griffiths harbour grave doubts 
concerning the massively modular view of mind, their position (on our 
favoured interpretation) seems to be that if those doubts were to be allayed, 
then the appeal to the antecedent identification of distinct cognitive devices 
would constitute a general solution to the grain problem. In contrast, our 
view is that it would not.  
 The difficulty for the devices-first strategy becomes clear once one 
realises that there will regularly be a second dimension to the grain problem, 
one which goes unnoticed by Sterelny and Griffiths. The fact is that it is not 
just adaptive problems that often form the kind of nested hierarchy that 
makes choosing a level of descriptive grain arbitrary; so do the parts of 
organisms that are potential solutions to adaptive problems. For example, 
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Lewontin (1978, p. 161) asks: "Is the leg a unit in evolution, so that the 
adaptive function of the leg can be inferred? If so, what about a part of the 
leg, say the foot, or a single toe, or one bone of a t one
 Evolutionary psychology's grain problem 10 
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sections we shall try to make this claim stick. (Henceforth we shall default 
to using 'the grain problem' as shorthand for the two-dimensional grain 
problem. Where we think there is room for confusion, we shall refer to the 
one-dimensional grain problem and the two-dimensional grain problem.) 
 
LEVELS OF ANALYSIS 
Mainstream evolutionary-psychological theorising is predicated on Marr's 
(1982) well-known conceptual framework for analysing an information-
processing system (Cosmides & Tooby, 1987, 1994a, 1994b). Famously, 
Marr proposed three distinct levels of analysis. (In the interests of keeping 
things clear, we note that a Marrian level of analysis is not the same thing as 
a level of descriptive grain.) As Marr's tripartite framework is central to our 
account, in what follows, of evolutionary-psychological theorising about 
social reasoning, we here briefly summarise that framework, as it applies 
within evolutionary psychology. (For a more detailed consideration of 
Marr’s levels of analysis and how they feature in evolutionary-
psychological theorising generally, see Atkinson & Wheeler, under review.) 
The backbone of evolutionary-psychological theorising is what Marr 
called the computational level of analysis — or, as we prefer, the ecological 
level (Sterelny, 1990). This is the level at which information-processing 
capacities are broadly characterised in terms of what a system can do, 
without any commitment as to the processes or mechanisms that enable the 
system to do those things. The rationale of this level of analysis is that, in 
order to understand how a system works — that is, in order to construct 
detailed theories about the mechanisms and processes that underpin and 
explain its observable behaviour — we must first understand what problems 
that system can solve and how it can solve them. This involves specifying 
cognitive capacities relative to the environment or background in which 
those capacities are displayed. An evolutionary psychologist working at this 
level draws upon knowledge of the design principles and practices of natural 
selection to provide a framework that informs and constrains her theories of 
the underlying psychological architecture. 
At the second, algorithmic level, possible algorithms by which the 
system under investigation might solve a given information-processing 
problem are specified, along with descriptions of the type of representation 
required for the input and output. The third level of analysis, the level of 
hardware implementation, concerns the physical realisation of those 
algorithms and representations (e.g., in neural structures and processes). 
There is an important difference between ecological-level theories on 
the one hand, and algorithmic- and implementational-level theories on the 
other. (We are here going beyond Marr's own account of these levels of 
analysis, although our intention is to elucidate rather than extend Marr's 
idea.) Ecological-level theories are concerned with capacities and properties 
of whole systems; paradigmatically, although, as we shall see, not 
exclusively, they are concerned with the way in which the behavioural 
responses and psychological capacities of whole organisms are related to the 
organism's EEA.3 Algorithmic- and implementational-level theories, in 
                                                
3 We say that the ecological level is paradigmatically but not exclusively concerned 
with whole organisms because (a) the parts of whole systems (e.g., the organs of 
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contrast, are concerned with parts of systems (their information-processing 
components and relevant inputs and outputs). This distinction between 
wholes and their parts is significant because whole systems will have 
capacities that their parts do not have. (See Bechtel & Richardson, 1993, 
and Bechtel, 1994a, for detailed discussion of this general point.) Moreover, 
there is an important sense in which system-level characterisations are able 
to 'ride free' of their subsystem-level explanations. Within the ecological 
level, there is no necessary commitment as to the functional architecture of 
the system; ecological-level theories can be neutral with respect to 
mechanism. Theories at the algorithmic and implementational levels, on the 
other hand, are proffered as accounts of, and thus presuppose, ecological-
level phenomena. (Or at any rate, to be psychologically relevant, 
algorithmic- and implementational-level theories should be proffered as 
accounts of ecological-level phenomena. This was Marr’s 1982, point in 
arguing for the utility, and indeed necessity, of the ecological level for 
psychology.)  
With this Marrian framework in place, we can understand the overall 
explanatory enterprise of evolutionary psychology as being the search for 
answers to two general and distinct kinds of question, which are 
nevertheless interconnected: (1) Working within the ecological level, the 
evolutionary psychologist wants to know how psychological capacities are 
related to adaptive problems. Given a psychological capacity, she will ask 
what selection pressures in the organism's EEA (if any) might have led to 
the evolution of that capacity. Given an adaptive problem, she will ask what 
psychological capacities might be solutions to that problem. (2) Moving 
between the ecological level on the one hand, and the algorithmic and 
implementational levels on the other, the evolutionary psychologist wants to 
know how adaptive problems and psychological capacities are related to 
features of the brain's information-processing architecture. Given a 
psychological capacity, she will ask whether there is a feature, or set of 
related features, of the psychological architecture underpinning that 
capacity. Given a feature, or set of related features, of the psychological 
architecture, she will ask what psychological capacities might those features 
underpin, and for what adaptive problem, or set of related adaptive 
problems, those features might have evolved to solve. 
Notice that within each of these two general kinds of question, there 
are two main sorts of inference employed by evolutionary psychologists, 
and by adaptationists generally. These are (a) inferring adaptive problems 
from phenotypic solutions, and (b) inferring phenotypic solutions from 
adaptive problems. In the next two sections, we draw on recent work in the 
evolutionary cognitive neuroscience of social cognition and reasoning, in 
order to show how these two kinds of inference play their part in enabling 
                                                                                                                        
organisms), when viewed at a lower level of description or organisation, can 
themselves be considered as whole systems (systems which will often, in turn, be 
decomposable into yet smaller subsystems), and (b) on our favoured interpretation 
of Marr's view, each of the three levels of analysis can be applied at different levels 
of organisation (Atkinson & Wheeler, under review; Bechtel, 1994b; McClamrock, 
1991). Thus, on this view, it is possible for parts of whole organisms (or perhaps 
even groups of whole organisms) to be the subject of ecological-level analyses. 
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evolutionary psychology to absorb the grain problem.4 Note, however, that 
the picture we are about to paint of two kinds of inference constituting two 
separate explanatory paths is an idealised one. We paint an idealised picture 
for ease of exposition, but as we shall elaborate later, the reader should bear 
in mind that these two inferential paths — from problems to solutions, and 
from solutions to problems — in fact work together to constitute a unified 
explanatory project, and that, in practice, any one researcher's explanatory 
endeavours may sometimes involve both kinds of inference. 
 
INFERRING ADAPTIVE PROBLEMS FROM THEIR SOLUTIONS: 
THE CASE OF REASONING 
What psychological mechanisms underlie our ability to reason and make 
decisions? The burgeoning search for the information-processing and neural 
substrates of reasoning and decision-making abilities in humans and other 
primates is beginning to show fruit. By way of illustration, we here 
concentrate on the neural substrate of social reasoning. Our aim is to 
highlight the way in which cognitive neuroscientists have appealed to 
evolutionary theory in order to help them make sense of the cognitive 
architecture underpinning social reasoning. That is, in this section we wish 
to illustrate the approach to evolutionary-psychological explanation that 
begins with proposals concerning how specific neural structures and 
processes underpin certain psychological capacities (in this case, those 
related to social cognition) and ends up by positing an adaptive problem or 
set of related adaptive problems for which those capacities and their 
architectural substrates are evolved solutions (see Figure 1). Our approach 
in what follows is briefly to survey the literature on the neural basis of 
social cognition, with particular reference to social reasoning, while keeping 
firmly in mind questions of the following sort: Why is the brain structured 
and organised this way? What are the various mechanisms for? How did 
they evolve? These are the sort of questions whose answers require appeal 
to selection pressures in ancestral environments, that is, to adaptive 
problems. We end this section by detailing one such attempt to provide a 
general answer to these sorts of questions in relation to social cognition, 
namely, the Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis. 
 
                                                
4 Sterelny and Griffiths (1999) themselves examine these two sorts of inference and 
the problems with each (see also Griffiths, 1996, 1997, 2001), but do not marry this 
examination with their discussion of the (one-dimensional) grain problem. The 
account we develop here is also to be distinguished from Cosmides and Tooby's 
writings on various strategies in evolutionary-psychological explanation (e.g., 
Cosmides & Tooby, 2000; Cosmides et al., 1992; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992, 1995, 
2000) — see Atkinson and Wheeler (under review) for details. 
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Recent research has shown that three of the most important areas of 
the brain for social cognition are the frontal lobes, especially the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex; the amygdala; and the superior temporal 
sulcus. We shall briefly discuss what has so far been revealed about the 
roles that each of these areas play in social cognition, before going on to 
summarise the Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis. 
The frontal lobes are critically involved in many higher cognitive 
capacities, such as those that enable us to behave in an organised way, to 
plan actions, to make decisions, and to decide what to attend to (for reviews 
see e.g., Damasio, 1994; Duncan, 1986, 1995; Luria, 1966; Miller, 2000; 
Milner, 1982; Passingham, 1993; Shallice, 1988). Certain memory abilities 
also involve the frontal lobes: several regions of prefrontal cortex are 
involved in episodic memory (Henson, Shallice, & Dolan, 1999; Lepage, 
Ghaffer, Nyberg, & Tulving, 2000), and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is 
critically involved in working memory (e.g., Goldman-Rakic, 1990, 1992; 
Milner, Petrides, & Smith, 1985). Not all higher cognitive capacities are 
dependent on the frontal lobes, however, for we know that frontal lobe 
lesions do not produce marked decrements in performance on standard 
intelligence tests (e.g., Black, 1976; Hebb, 1939; Milner, 1964). But what is 
most relevant for present purposes is the importance of the frontal lobes in 
social cognition, and in particular, the subdivision known as the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC). (This area includes a significant 
part of the cortex behind the eyes, that is, part of orbitofrontal cortex or 
OFC. Hence the two terms are sometimes used interchangeably.) 
VMPFC is particularly involved in social reasoning and decision 
making (for reviews see Adolphs, 1999; Adolphs, Tranel, Bechara, 
Damasio, & Damasio, 1996; Allison, Puce, & McCarthy, 2000; Barton & 
Dunbar, 1997; Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2000; Brothers, 1990, 1997; 
Damasio, 1994; Raleigh et al., 1996; Stone, 2000; Tranel, Bechara, & 
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Damasio, 2000). For instance, work by Adolphs, Damasio and colleagues 
(Adolphs, 1999; Adolphs et al., 1996; Bechara et al., 2000; Damasio, 1994) 
has shown that lesions to VMPFC selectively impair decision-making that 
depends on associations with emotional experience (e.g., gambles based on 
hunches) and performance on social contract versions of the Wason 
selection task. These authors conclude that the VMPFC plays a vital role "in 
linking perceptual representations of stimuli with representations of their 
emotional and social significance" (Adolphs, 1999, p. 474; see especially 
Damasio, 1994). 
 The ventromedial or orbitofrontal region is also implicated in certain 
aspects of 'theory of mind', that is, in some of the cluster of abilities 
involved in explaining and predicting behaviour by attributing mental states. 
For example, Stone, Baron-Cohen and Knight's (1998) patients, who had 
bilateral OFC damage, exhibited performance within the normal range on 
first- and second-order false belief tasks, but were nevertheless significantly 
impaired in their performance on subtler forms of social reasoning involving 
mental state attributions, such as recognising a faux pas in a story. Rowe, 
Bullock, Polkey and Morris' (2001) study suggests that performance on 
first- and second-order false belief tasks might be compromised by more 
general but unilateral frontal lesions (their patients' brain damage was 
limited to either left or right frontal cortex but varied in both extent and 
exact location). There is also the tentative finding by Stuss, Gallup and 
Alexander (2001), whose patients had lesions in the region of VMPFC/ 
OFC, especially in the right hemisphere. These patients were impaired on a 
task that required them to infer that they were being deceived by the 
experimental assistant; in contrast, patients with lesions throughout the 
frontal lobes, but particularly in the right hemisphere, were impaired on a 
task that required them to infer visual experience in others. 
 The amygdala has a multifaceted role in social cognition (Adolphs, 
1999; Aggleton, 2000; Baron-Cohen et al., 2000; Brothers, 1990; Emery & 
Amaral, 1999; Kling & Brothers, 1992), as well as in other capacities, such 
as associative learning (e.g., Bechara et al., 1995; Davis, 1992; La Bar, Le 
Doux, Spencer, & Phelps, 1995, 1998; Le Doux, 1995; Rolls, 1999; 
Weiskrantz, 1956). Lesion-based neuropsychological experiments, 
functional brain-imaging and other neurophysiological measures all 
converge on the finding that the amygdala plays a key role in the processing 
of emotional signals, especially those related to fear and in some cases 
anger, resulting in the triggering of appropriate physiological and 
behavioural responses (e.g., Adolphs et al., 1999b; Allman & Brothers, 
1994; Broks et al., 1998; Calder et al., 1996, 1998; Le Doux, 1995; Morris 
et al., 1998; Morris et al., 1996; Scott et al., 1997; Tranel, 1997; Young et 
al., 1995; Young, Hellawell, Van De Wal, & Johnson, 1996). A word of 
caution here, however: The jury is still out on whether the amygdala's role 
in humans (and in other primates) is specific to stimuli related to social 
threat or to threat and danger in general (Adolphs, 1999; Adolphs, Russell, 
& Tranel, 1999a; Adolphs & Tranel, 1999; Adolphs, Tranel, & Damasio, 
1998; Allman & Brothers, 1994; Brothers, 1992; Kling & Brothers, 1992, 
1998; Le Doux, 1995). Indeed, some authors propose that the amygdala is 
not so much involved in dealing with threats, but instead plays a role in 
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dealing with situations of distress (Blair, Morris, Frith, Perrett, & Dolan, 
1999) or stimulus ambiguity (Whalen, 1999). 
The amygdala, especially the left amygdala, is also implicated as part 
of a neural circuit underpinning theory of mind abilities (Baron-Cohen, 
1995; Baron-Cohen et al., 2000; Fine, Lumsden, & Blair, 2001; Stone, 
2000). In particular, research so far has shown that the amygdala is involved 
in: (a) processing information about biological motion (Bonda, Petrides, 
Ostry, & Evans, 1996; Brothers, Ring, & Kling, 1990), especially in 
enabling us to attribute social meaning to moving stimuli (Heberlein et al., 
1998); (b) the perception of eye gaze (Kawashima et al., 1999; Young et al., 
1995; though see Broks et al., 1998 for a word of caution), allowing us, for 
example, to judge someone's mental state from eye gaze alone (Baron-
Cohen et al., 1999); and (c) the ability to appreciate that people can have 
false beliefs and the related ability to deploy knowledge about mental states 
in order to understand jokes and non-literal speech such as sarcasm and 
metaphor (Fine et al., 2001). 
The superior temporal sulcus (STS) has also been implicated as an 
important structure in theory of mind abilities (Frith & Frith, 1999), again 
especially via its involvement in the perception of eye gaze and of 
biological motion (Abell et al., 1999; Emery, 2000; Hietanen & Perrett, 
1996; Perrett et al., 1989; Perrett et al., 1991; Perrett et al., 1985), including 
motion of the head, mouth, hands, and whole body, and even of implied 
biological motion (see Allison et al., 2000; Carey, Perrett, & Oram, 1997; 
Jellema & Perrett, 2001, for reviews). Indeed, the STS both sends 
projections to the amygdala and receives projections from it (Amaral, Price, 
Pitkanen, & Carmichael, 1992), which goes some way to explaining the 
shared functions of these structures. Moreover, the amygdala is reciprocally 
connected to the orbitofrontal/ ventromedial region (Amaral et al., 1992). So 
the VM prefrontal cortex, amygdala, and STS together form a system for 
social cognition, including social reasoning.5 
It is now time to step back from the details of the neurological 
underpinnings of social cognition and to consider, as some evolutionary 
psychologists and neuroscientists do, those questions with which we began 
this section. We can here summarise these questions as follows: How and 
why did our many specialised cognitive abilities evolve? And in particular, 
how and why did the specialised circuitry for social reasoning evolve? As 
indicated in Figure 1, one popular suggestion is the social or Machiavellian 
intelligence hypothesis (Byrne & Whiten, 1988, 1991, 1992; Dunbar, 1998; 
Whiten & Byrne, 1997). 
The general idea of the Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis is that 
group living sets up an environment in which each individual is out to get 
the best or most he can by using strategies of social manipulation, but 
without causing such disruption that his membership in the group is 
                                                
5 The overall neuro-computational basis of social cognition is likely to be more 
complex than this, however, involving these three neural structures in ways not 
surveyed here, and probably also certain other parts of the brain. See, for example, 
Damasio's (1994, 1999) ideas about the role of somatosensory cortex in social 
cognition, and the exciting work on 'mirror neurons' and how they might be 
involved in certain theory of mind abilities (Gallese, 2000a, 2000b; Gallese & 
Goldman, 1998; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Gallese, 1999). 
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jeopardised. This hypothesis began with Humphrey's (1976) observation 
that primates appear to have more intelligence than they need for their 
everyday tasks of feeding and ranging, and his subsequent suggestion that 
the social complexity inherent in many primate groups would have been a 
significant selection pressure acting to increase primate intelligence. This 
idea has since gained credence from the finding that average social group 
size and neo-cortex size are positively correlated across species: the bigger 
the social groupings, the bigger is the neo-cortex relative to the rest of the 
brain (Aiello & Dunbar, 1993; Dunbar, 1992, 1995; Sawaguchi & Kudo, 
1990). When we turn to the question of dedicated psychological 
mechanisms for social reasoning, the Machiavellian hypothesis predicts that 
the many specialised cognitive abilities of primates evolved via an arms race 
in which individuals competed with each other, and formed alliances with 
some to compete with others, using increasingly sophisticated social 
strategies. The hypothesis thus predicts psychological mechanisms 
specialised for pro-social behaviour such as co-operation and altruism, as 
well as for coercion and deception, and mechanisms for predicting 
behaviour and for 'reading' the mental states of conspecifics. These 
psychological capacities have been operationalised as, and their presence in 
children and nonhuman primates tested by means of tasks probing, for 
example: self-recognition and self-directed actions, gaze following and joint 
visual attention, co-operative problem-solving, joint role comprehension, 
understanding of false beliefs, and several forms of tactical deception and 
intentional teaching (for reviews and critical discussion see Baron-Cohen, 
1995, 1999; Byrne, 1995; Byrne & Whiten, 1988, 1992; Heyes, 1998; 
Povinelli, 1999; Povinelli & Preuss, 1995; Povinelli & Prince, 1998; 
Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Tomasello & Call, 1997; Whiten, 1991, 1999; 
Whiten & Byrne, 1988, 1997). 
Our discussion of this work on social reasoning illustrates how 
theorising in the cognitive and brain sciences involves a sophisticated 
methodology in which the theorist moves back and forth between the 
ecological and sub-ecological levels of analysis. In adopting the strategy of 
inferring problems from solutions, the investigator's explanatory endeavours 
begin at the ecological level, whether explicitly or not. Working within that 
level of analysis (refer to the right-hand side of Figure 1), the investigator 
takes a psychological capacity (e.g., theory of mind abilities) and breaks it 
down into a set of subcapacities (e.g., the perception of eye gaze and of 
biological motion, and the appreciation of false belief). She might then 
continue to decompose each of these subcapacities into yet more specific 
subcapacities, and so on. At each stage of this decompositional analysis, the 
postulated subcapacities may be revised, supplemented with additional 
subcapacities, or replaced by alternatives, in the light of relevant evidence. 
The next stage in this inferential strategy is to switch to the algorithmic or 
implementational levels, or both, and ask, for each capacity identified at the 
ecological level, whether there are in fact any such features of the 
psychological architecture under
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which underpin the capacity in question (e.g., the pressures grouped 
together under the Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis). 
 
INFERRING SOLUTIONS FROM ADAPTIVE PROBLEMS: 
THE CASE OF REASONING 
Evolutionary cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists do not only infer 
adaptive problems from psychological capacities. They also infer 
psychological capacities from adaptive problems. For example, in 
investigating reasoning and decision-making abilities, one might start from 
a higher-level theory whose essence is that many of the most serious 
adaptive challenges for primates took place during social interactions with 
conspecifics. One might start, for instance, with the Machiavellian 
intelligence hypothesis (refer Figure 2). One might then propose that certain 
specific pressures in the social environments of primates, including the 
human EEA, selected for certain psychological mechanisms that enabled 
our ancestors to make decisions concerning who to form alliances with, who 
to share precious food and other resources with, who to avoid for fear of 
being beaten up, who to groom, who to mate with, and so forth. 
 On the basis of some such account of the likely selection pressures for 
social decision-making, the evolutionary psychologist would (or at any rate, 
should) then embark on a two-part search for candidate solutions to those 
adaptive problems. First, she would remain at the ecological level of 
analysis, and search for psychological capacities that might have been direct 
responses to those selection pressures in the organism's ancestors. Having 
identified a list of specific adaptive problems and candidate solutions to 
those problems, she would then drop to the algorithmic or implementational 
levels, or both, and search for underlying architectural features in that 
organism that subserve or underpin those capacities. This will involve an 
'engineering analysis': constructing and testing plausible arguments about 
how individual phenotypic features function as well-engineered adaptive 
devices (see e.g., Dawkins, 1986; Lewontin, 1978; Tooby & Cosmides, 
1992; Williams, 1966). It should also involve, but often does not, 
comparative testing of these hypothesised adaptations (Griffiths, 1996, 
1997, 2001), that is, analysing the historical development of these 
phenotypic features across related species. 
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 There are several good examples of theories of human reasoning and 
decision-making explicitly motivated by and grounded in considerations of 
ancestral selection pressures. We shall now briefly introduce two of them — 
social contract theory and hazard management or precaution theory — in 
order to illustrate how evolutionary psychologists have engaged in this two-
part search for candidate solutions (psychological mechanisms) to adaptive 
problems (likely selection pressures). (We discuss a third theory in a later 
section.) 
 Social contract theory is concerned with deontic reasoning, that is, 
reasoning about obligations, permissions, and prohibitions. Its particular 
focus is with reasoning in situations of social exchange — situations in 
which individuals exchange resources and favours (e.g., Cosmides, 1989; 
Cosmides & Tooby, 1989, 1992, 1997; Fiddick, 1998; Fiddick, Cosmides, 
& Tooby, 2000; Gigerenzer & Hug, 1992). The primary proponents of this 
theory, Cosmides and Tooby, began by drawing upon some ideas and 
general observations about human social interaction from evolutionary 
biology, game theory and economics, to derive some conclusions about the 
selection pressures likely to have shaped social reasoning. One idea they 
focused upon was that much human social behaviour involves bestowing 
benefits or inflicting costs on others (helping or hurting them), and that 
these acts are performed conditionally. For example, a person will generally 
aid a non-relative only if he has himself received help from that person in 
the past, or if there is good reason to believe that that person will reciprocate 
the good deed in the future. This idea is the essence of the theory of 
reciprocal altruism (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Trivers, 1971), according to 
which psychological mechanisms supporting altruistic behaviour towards 
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non-relatives can evolve as long as the benefits bestowed on others are 
reciprocated. So under these lights, human interaction is saturated with 
social conditionals, that is, with what Cosmides and Tooby describe as 
"statements or behaviours that express an intention to make one's behaviour 
contingent upon that of another" (Cosmides & Tooby, 1997, p. 140). 
 So social contract theory is derived principally from the more general 
theory of reciprocal altruism. Continuing down the hierarchy of levels of 
theorising, Cosmides and Tooby derived a specific evolutionary hypothesis 
from social contract theory, namely, that an important selection pressure in 
the human EEA was one that selected "for cognitive designs that can detect 
and understand social conditionals reliably, precisely and economically" 
(Cosmides & Tooby, 1997, p. 140). But given that this selection pressure is 
still at a fairly high level of description, it is of more use in informing 
ecological-level theories about the general kinds of cognitive capacities 
involved in social reasoning and decision-making than it is in informing 
theories of the underlying cognitive machinery. Finer-grained selection 
pressures are required to inform detailed dissection of psychological 
mechanisms, insofar as having these finer-grained selection pressures to 
hand allows the evolutionary psychologist to draw up a list of design 
features that those mechanisms must embody. In our example of the 
evolutionary psychology of reasoning, it is at this stage in the explanatory 
enterprise that the concept of social exchange comes to the fore. Cosmides 
and Tooby reasoned that social exchanges or contracts are an important 
category of social conditional, and further, that detecting cheaters is an 
important adaptive problem for those engaging in social exchange. Cheaters 
in this context are those who break a social contract, that is, those who 
accept a benefit without paying an appropriate cost, such as someone who 
receives a favour but does not return it. 
 So we now have a reasonably specific adaptive problem that was 
arrived at by decomposing a general or high-level selection pressure into 
more specific or lower-level pressures. The pressure for forming social 
contracts and the concomitant pressure for detecting cheaters were derived 
from the pressure for reliable, precise and economical detection and 
understanding of social conditionals in general. Famously, Cosmides and 
Tooby went on to propose that the human cognitive architecture contains 
mechanisms specialised for detecting cheaters in social exchange, and to test 
this idea using variations on the Wason selection task (see especially 
Cosmides, 1989; Cosmides & Tooby, 1989, 1992, 1997; see also Gigerenzer 
& Hug, 1992). But the important matter for present purposes is that 
Cosmides and Tooby proposed some specific design features of the 
psychological architecture underlying social exchange by examining what 
evolutionary biology and game theory had to say about these selection 
pressures. They (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992) derived a "partial list" of design 
features at the algorithmic level of analysis that must be embodied by the 
psychological mechanisms of a species engaging in social exchange. This 
list includes algorithms for: assessing costs and benefits, regardless of the 
goods or services exchanged; recognising other individuals; remembering 
one's interactions with others; communicating one's values, needs and 
desires to others; and recognising someone else's values, needs and desires. 
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 One might continue along this explanatory path by decomposing each 
of these fairly broadly defined algorithms into more specific ones. For 
example, the ability to remember one's past interactions with others might 
involve, inter alia, algorithms for remembering whether people were 
previously co-operators or cheaters, and for remembering and updating 
records of who owes what to whom. To take another example, person 
recognition might involve the operation of algorithms for face and voice 
recognition, and for storing, organising and retrieving semantic and episodic 
knowledge about people. 
 Once the evolutionary psychologist has arrived at some such specific 
hypotheses about the information-processing architecture underlying the 
psychological capacities in question, these hypotheses must, of course, be 
tested, by using behavioural experiments, for example (e.g., those 
employing the Wason selection task). The next major step in the 
explanatory enterprise, which can also serve to test these algorithmic-level 
hypotheses, is to search for the neural substrates of these postulated features 
of the cognitive architecture. Clearly, then, it is in this next step in the 
explanatory enterprise that a link with the discussion of the previous section 
emerges. In terms of our idealised account, evolutionary psychologists who 
infer phenotypic solutions from adaptive problems will eventually be 
concerned with just those findings with which theorists who adopt the 
converse inferential strategy begin, namely, data concerning the neural 
substrate of psychological capacities. 
 We shall shortly mention some (admittedly initial and tentative) 
neuropsychological evidence for social contract theory. As that evidence 
also involves a second and complementary theory of deontic reasoning, we 
shall first need to introduce that second theory. 
 Social contract theory explanations of patterns of performance on 
conditional reasoning tasks are not exclusive, despite implications to that 
effect in the early literature (e.g., Cosmides, 1989). Cheng and Holyoak 
(1989) and Manktelow and Over (1990) showed that precaution rules, which 
lack the cost-benefit structure of a social contract — such as 'If you clear up 
spilt blood then you must wear rubber gloves' — also facilitate conditional 
reasoning. Cheng and Holyoak (1989) used such results as ammunition 
against social contract theory and evolutionary psychology more generally, 
whereas Manktelow and Over (1990) were only showing that the initial 
statement of social contract theory was too strong. Subsequently, Cosmides, 
Tooby, and Fiddick (Cosmides & Tooby, 1997; Fiddick, 1998; Fiddick et 
al., 2000) ran with Manktelow and Over's view that social contract theory 
can explain some but not all instances of facilitation on conditional 
reasoning tasks, and gave it a more detailed evolutionary twist by 
developing the complementary hazard management or precaution theory.6 
                                                
6 Manktelow and Over (1990), who can be credited with the discovery of 
precaution rules facilitating reasoning (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992, p. 205), inferred 
this idea from the simple assumption that people have some basic ability at 
practical reasoning (rather than a more specific ability at detecting cheaters in 
social contracts). So hazard management theory did not first arise via the line of 
theorising we are focusing on in this section, that is, as involving the inference of a 
cognitive solution from an adaptive problem. Nevertheless, in the hands of Fiddick, 
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The central idea of hazard management theory is that, since the ability to 
avoid hazards (predators, poisonous critters, cliffs, etc.) would have been of 
significant evolutionary advantage to our ancestors, we should expect to 
find within the human cognitive architecture a system specialised for 
reasoning about hazards and precautions  Moreover, on this view, the hazard 
management system should be separate from the social contract system, 
since hazard avoidance and social exchange involve 
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solutions and inferring phenotypic solutions from adaptive problems. 
Regrettably we cannot. It is early days in the evolutionary cognitive 
neuroscience of reasoning, and such an integration has not as yet established 
itself in the literature. We are nevertheless hopeful that it will. In the 
meantime, what we can do is say what the methodological reflections of last 
two sections tell us about the prospects for evolutionary psychology in the 
face of the grain problem. 
We have illustrated, with reference to work in the cognitive 
neuroscience of reasoning, a sophisticated explanatory strategy in which the 
theorist moves within and between levels of description and levels of 
analysis. We suggest that once the explanatory endeavours of evolutionary 
psychologists are seen under these lights, any worry that progress in 
evolutionary psychology is stymied by the grain problem turns out to be 
unfounded. Here is why. 
The picture that we have painted so far, of two separate explanatory 
paths is, as we forewarned, an idealised one. At times we gave the 
impression that different researchers will adopt different approaches: 
inferring psychological capacities and mechanisms from adaptive problems, 
or inferring adaptive problems from psychological capacities and 
mechanisms. But in reality, and as we indicated in our two diagrams, the 
two approaches are complementary, and many researchers will adopt both 
approaches, sometimes at the same sitting. Moreover, ideally there is a 
dynamic and mutually constraining relationship between these two 
approaches. A theorist who is attempting to infer an adaptive problem from 
a phenotypic solution will benefit from what her colleagues in psychology, 
anthropology and evolutionary biology have to say about the likely selection 
pressures on our ancestors that are relevant to the phenotypic solution in 
question. And a theorist who is attempting to infer a phenotypic solution 
from an adaptive problem will benefit from what her colleagues in 
psychology and neuroscience have to say about the features of our 
psychological architecture that might be relevant to the adaptive problem in 
question. 
As a result of this mutual guidance and constraint, theories at each 
level of analysis co-develop, both within a given level of description and 
especially between levels of description. (Cf. Churchland's (1986) account 
of the 'co-evolution' of theories at different levels of description.) In other 
words, theories at a given level of description concerning the adaptive 
function, the algorithms, inputs and outputs, and the neural hardware 
relevant to some psychological capacity are informed and constrained by 
theories about the adaptive function, the algorithms, inputs and outputs, and 
the neural hardware relevant to that psychological capacity at various other 
levels of description. Importantly, we suggest, this recurring reciprocal 
feedback between theories at different levels of analysis and description has 
the effect of neutralising the grain problem. Recall that the two-dimensional 
grain problem genuinely threatens the evolutionary-psychological enterprise 
of explaining adapted traits in terms of adaptive problems. The essence of 
this threat is that, in many cases, both the choice of grain at which to specify 
adaptive problems, and the choice of grain at which to specify adapted 
traits, appear to be arbitrary. But given that, as we have now argued, the 
very methodology of evolutionary theorising about the mind/brain means 
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that there will often be equally legitimate stories to be told about a given 
psychological capacity at different levels of description, the pressure to 
single out a unique level of description at which adaptive problems and 
phenotypic traits (including cognitive devices) must be described simply 
dissipates. And once this fact is recognised, the grain problem ceases to be a 
serious in-principle difficulty. 
At this point one might raise the worry that this multilevel explanatory 
enterprise places no clear restrictions on what counts as a good 
evolutionary-psychological explanation, such that evolutionary 
psychologists are free to avail themselves of whatever level of description, 
or combination of levels of description, will happen to tell a cogent story. 
But this worry can be met, for implicit in the methodology as we have 
described it is a means for constraining the choice between sets of levels and 
thus the boundaries of evolutionary-psychological explanation. In general 
terms, an overall, multilevel account of a given psychological capacity is 
constrained by the requirement that the component theories at each of the 
different levels must ultimately be consistent with, and indeed interlock 
with, each other. But more specifically, mutual guidance and constraint 
between theories at different levels, and between the differently directed 
inferential strategies at work in evolutionary psychology, should (one might 
think) narrow down the range of possible and acceptable theories, and thus 
take us closer to nature's real joints. (These points are developed in more 
detail in Atkinson & Wheeler, under review.) 
 
A DISPUTE DISSOLVED? 
In the remainder of this chapter we shall identify some consequences of the 
foregoing discussion, by investigating one more research programme in 
which the strategy of inferring architectural solutions from adaptive 
problems gets played out. We shall then have on the table three theories of 
deontic reasoning, two of which are complementary and together appear in 
dispute with the third. However, once we place this supposed disagreement 
in the context of the kind of multilevel evolutionary-psychological 
explanation that (we have argued) is resistant to the grain problem, the air of 
conflict appears to subside. 
 In contrast to the combination of social contract and hazard 
management theories, dominance hierarchy theory proposes a single system 
specialised for all forms of deontic reasoning (Cummins, 1996a, 1996b, 
1998, 1999, 2000). Cummins observes that when we reason about deontic 
rules, we overwhelmingly adopt a violation-detection strategy, whereas 
when we reason about indicative rules (i.e., descriptions of the world, about 
what is true or false), we adopt a confirmation-seeking strategy. She argues 
that this difference in reasoning strategies is fundamental, and that we 
should expect it to be reflected in the cognitive architecture. We adopt a 
violation-detection strategy and are thereby proficient deontic reasoners, 
Cummins argues, thanks to a domain-specific system that evolved as the 
result of selection pressures related to dominance hierarchies (though see 
Chater & Oaksford, 1996 for a counter-argument). 
Dominance hierarchies are characterised by competition and co-
operation amongst conspecifics for limited resources (food, mates, etc). An 
animal's position within a dominance hierarchy is highly correlated with 
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access to those resources: the higher the rank, the greater the share and 
control over the available resources. Moreover, rank crucially depends on 
skilful social interaction and manipulation, especially the ability to form and 
maintain alliances. Cummins' idea is that a significant component of this set 
of skills is adeptness in social reasoning, especially of the deontic variety. 
Reasoning effectively about what oneself and others are obliged to do is 
central to success in forming and maintaining alliances, and in fulfilling 
other social contracts, especially when those obligations are reciprocal. 
Moving up in the world depends on trading favours. And reasoning 
effectively about what oneself and others are permitted and forbidden to do 
allows higher-ranking individuals to detect lower-ranking transgressors (so 
they can be warned or punished) and lower-ranking individuals to avoid 
transgressions, or to engage in deceptive transgression (thus avoiding 
threatening encounters and punishment). So moving up in the world also 
depends on following the law, and on breaking the law while not being seen. 
Cummins (1996a, 1996b) cites a variety of evidence in support of her 
claim that the human cognitive architecture includes an evolved system 
specialised for deontic reasoning. Numerous studies of reasoning in non-
human primates show a 'social content effect', that is, these animals make 
various sorts of inferences much more readily in social tasks, such as kin 
and dominance rank discriminations (e.g., Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990; 
Dasser, 1985), than they do in non-social, object-oriented tasks (e.g., 
Gillian, 1981; McGonigle & Chalmers, 1977). Developmental studies show 
that (a) children are considerably more accomplished at deontic reasoning 
than they are at indicative reasoning, (b) that, like adults, they tend to adopt 
violation-seeking strategies for deontic rules and confirmation-seeking 
strategies for indicative rules, and (c) that this differential ability is 
established early in life, around 3 to 4 years of age (e.g., Cummins, 1996c; 
Harris & Nunez, 1996; Nunez & Harris, 1998). And there is some cross-
cultural evidence for the indicative-deontic distinction, including indirect 
evidence from members of preliterate societies (see Cummins, 1996b for a 
review). 
Cummins also cites neuropsychological studies in humans and 
monkeys that show evidence of a selective deficit of deontic reasoning. As 
we noted earlier, lesions to frontal cortex, especially VM prefrontal cortices, 
can result in severe impairments in social behaviour and reasoning, such as 
reduced inhibitions, an inability to organise and plan future actions, 
impairments in making decisions that depend on associations with 
emotional experience (e.g., gambles based on hunches), and a lack of 
concern for oneself and others (see Adolphs, 1999; Adolphs et al., 1996; 
Bechara et al., 2000; Damasio, 1994 for reviews). Results of this kind lead 
Cummins to claim that damage to prefrontal cortices "impacts most severely 
on the capacity to respond effectively to the social rules that underlie the 
dominance hierarchy" (Cummins, 1996b, p. 176). 
In Cummins' work, then, we again see an example of an evolutionary 
psychologist using the inferential strategy of reasoning from adaptive 
problems to psychological solutions. At the ecological level of analysis, she 
began by deriving dominance hierarchy theory from the general claim that 
the social complexity inherent in many primate groups would have been a 
significant selection pressure acting to increase primate intelligence 
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(roughly, the Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis). That theory makes 
certain claims about adaptive problems related to dominance hierarchies, 
from which Cummins inferred a psychological capacity that plausibly plays 
a significant role in solving those adaptive problems, namely, adopting a 
violation-detection strategy in deontic reasoning. She then dropped to the 
sub-ecological levels of analysis to propose a mind/brain mechanism that 
underpins that capacity, namely, a deontic reasoning system, and garnered a 
variety of converging evidence for such a system (at least a significant part 
of which is supposed be located within the frontal lobes).7 
So how many distinct psychological mechanisms or modules underpin 
deontic reasoning? As we have seen, Cummins argues that a single 
mechanism underpins deontic reasoning, whereas Fiddick, Cosmides and 
Tooby argue for two separate systems, one for social contracts, the other for 
hazard management. Cummins' argument is based on the claim that the 
relevant selection pressures confronting our ancestors selected for the ability 
to reason about permissions, obligations and prohibitions within dominance 
hierarchies. Hence, on her view, all deontic reasoning, including that about 
hazards or precautions, is restricted to the social realm.8 The arguments of 
Fiddick, Cosmides and Tooby, in contrast, are based on the claim that there 
were two separate sets of pressures, both selecting for deontic reasoning 
abilities: one for the ability to reason about precautions (allowing our 
ancestors to avoid hazards), the other for the ability to reason about social 
                                                
7 Here we see that Cummins has moved more-or-less straight from the ecological 
level of analysis to the implementational level, thus skipping explicit theorising at 
the algorithmic level. Such skipping of algorithmic-level theorising is quite 
common in these early days of cognitive neuroscience. This is no more so than in 
the cognitive neuroscience of reasoning, where there is a marked paucity of formal 
models and simulations of domain-specific reasoning abilities such as those that we 
have been discussing. An exception, of course, is the large body of work on 
formalising and modelling higher-level (and sometimes more domain-general) 
theories of reasoning, such as the Prisoner's dilemma (see e.g., Axelrod, 1984; 
Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Emshoff, 1970; Hayashi, 1995; Messick & Liebrand, 
1993; Nauta & Hoeksta, 1995; Watanabe & Yamagishi, 1999). The ecological 
rationality programme (Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Research Group, 1999) 
might also be regarded as a notable exception. This programme proposes a variety 
of "simple heuristics" ("fast and frugal" procedures that exploit the structure of 
environments to produce ecologically useful inferences and decisions) as the 
algorithmic underpinnings of many of our reasoning and decision-making abilities. 
We should nevertheless note that ecological-level theorising for those pursuing the 
ecological rationality programme does not focus solely, or even primarily, on 
adaptive problems in ancesteral environments. On their view, ecological rationality 
has a wider purview than evolutionary psychology (the latter being grounded in the 
former), encompassing decision making in modern as well as ancesteral 
environments (see Over, 2000a, 2000b; Todd, Fiddick & Kraus, 2000, for 
discussion). 
8 Others have also argued that deontic reasoning is inherently social, though not in 
terms of dominance hierarchy theory. For example, Manktelow and Over (1991) 
argue that how one represents a deontic rule, and thus how one reasons about that 
rule, depends on the social role one adopts with respect to it, viz. whether one 
represents the utilities associated with the agent who lays down the rule or with the 
actor whose behaviour is its target. 
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contracts (allowing our ancestors to trade favours and goods, and to detect 
cheaters). With respect to deontic reasoning, then, the social realm for 
Fiddick, Cosmides and Tooby is more restricted than it is for Cummins; it is 
reasoning about social contracts that is crucial to Fiddick, Cosmides and 
Tooby's view, not reasoning within dominance hierarchies (which might 
subsume some or all reasoning about social contracts), or social reasoning in 
general (which would subsume reasoning about social contracts). 
Certainly the neuropsychological data do not yet allow us to decide 
between dominance hierarchy theory and social contract plus hazard 
management theories. The neuropsychological study of reasoning is still in 
its infancy; there is as yet insufficient evidence to make any firm 
conclusions about how specific types of social behaviour and reasoning map 
on to specific brain regions. For instance, it is an open question as to 
whether selective impairment on social contract versions of the Wason 
selection task after VM prefrontal cortex lesions (Adolphs et al., 1996) 
result because VMPFC forms a crucial part of a system specialised for 
reasoning about social contracts or for reasoning about dominance 
hierarchies (which would include reasoning about social contracts). That 
being said, there is at least one study that provides more direct support for 
Cummins' theory over social contract theory, which turns on the difference 
between the two theories with respect to social rank: dominance hierarchy 
theory predicts social reasoning to be affected by rank whereas social 
contract theory does not make this prediction. Work by Raleigh and 
colleagues (Raleigh et al., 1996) has shown that the density of serotonin 
receptors in the orbitofrontal cortex of monkeys varies according to rank, 
and that social behaviour and rank are affected by manipulation of serotonin 
neurotransmission. (See Cummins, 1996a, 1996b, 1998, 1999, 2000, for 
further evidence and arguments for dominance hierarchy theory as against 
social contract theory. And see Fiddick, 1998 for a counter-argument, which 
centres on the claim that, pace Cummins, all deontic reasoning — 
specifically, reasoning about precautions — is not intrinsically social 
reasoning.) 
While the empirical adequacy of these theories is undoubtedly crucial, 
the main point that we wish to highlight here is this: the interdisciplinary, 
multilevel explanatory enterprise that we have outlined in the wake of the 
grain problem, brings to the fore the possibility that the positions of 
Cummins on the one hand, and of Cosmides, Tooby, and Fiddick on the 
other, may not be in competition after all. For it is plausible that these two 
sets of theories are pitched at different levels of description, and are thus 
potentially compatible. Specifically, Cummins' dominance hierarchy theory 
is pitched at a higher level than social contract and hazard management 
theories, proposing higher-level selection pressures and corresponding 
psychological mechanisms. So consider, for example, how one might get 
from Cummins' position to that of Fiddick, Cosmides and Tooby. One might 
first seek to decompose the higher-level selection pressure for deontic 
reasoning within dominance hierarchies into more specific selection 
pressures at a lower level of description. One might also decompose the 
ability to adopt a violation-detection strategy in deontic reasoning into more 
specific or lower-level psychological capacities. The second step in this 
continuation of Cummins' work would then be to identify the more specific 
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psychological mechanisms at lower levels of description that together 
compose the larger deontic reasoning system, and whose joint operation 
underpins the adoption of a violation-detection strategy in deontic reasoning 
tasks. Interestingly, Cummins herself is open to this move, at times 
implying the possibility that a single deontic reasoning system might itself 
be decomposed into subsystems (vide, for example, Cummins, 1996b, p. 
177). Once all this has been done, it is at least conceivable that the 
subsystems of the larger deontic reasoning system that one ends up with are 
something like the subsystems proposed by Fiddick, Cosmides and Tooby. 
Of course, arriving at that position would first require one to revise 
Cummins' initial claim that the selection pressures for deontic reasoning are 
specific to dominance hierarchies (i.e., the claim that all deontic reasoning is 
inherently social). Indeed, the main unresolved issue blocking a 
reconciliation of these two positions is whether reasoning about non-social 
precautions engages a deontic reasoning mechanism (as Cosmides, Tooby, 
and Fiddick claim), or not (as Cummins claims). The resolution of this 
particular disagreement is an empirical matter. Be that as it may, our point is 
that the multilevel explanatory enterprise allows us to see how a 
reconciliation might proceed.9 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Our take-home message is this. The grain problem is even more serious than 
Sterelny and Griffiths' account suggests. Nevertheless, that problem is not a 
silver bullet for evolutionary psychology. So as far as this particular threat is 
concerned, the explanatory credentials of a truly interdisciplinary, scientific, 
and evolutionary approach to the human mind remain in good shape. 
                                                
9 Although we do not pursue the matter in detail here, the foregoing discussion 
provides support for a more general conclusion that we have argued for in detail 
elsewhere (Atkinson and Wheeler, under review; Wheeler and Atkinson, 2001). In 
many cases at least, there will be no stage at which one could provide a definitive 
answer to the question of whether a psychological capacity is domain-specific or 
domain-general, because that would require one to fix a unique level of 
description, from which judgements about domain specificity or domain generality 
could be made, and the regular failure to fix such a level of description is just what 
is suggested by the theoretical endeavours that we have been illustrating. If this is 
right, then regardless of whether the two positions on deontic reasoning highlighted 
in the main text are compatible, it may well be that at no point in the continuing 
evolutionary-psychological enterprise could one provide a definitive answer to the 
question of whether deontic reasoning is domain-specific in the sense suggested by 
Cummins, or whether it is instead a function of more domain-general abilities. 
Similarly, at no point could one say definitively, as Cosmides, Tooby, and Fiddick 
are wont to do, that social contract reasoning and precaution reasoning constitute 
two distinct domain-specific abilities rather than two facets of a higher-level, more 
domain-general ability. 
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